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Abstract
This paper investigates alternative futures of security in the Middle East in an attempt to
discover a path that could take the region from an insecure past to a more secure future.
Looking at five scenarios about the future of world politics, namely, globalisation, fragmen-
tation, clash of civilisations, democratic peace and the formation of a security community, the
paper argues that although each scenario has its strengths (as well as weaknesses), it is the
scenario that foresees the establishment of a security community that incorporates a more
explicit consideration for shaping a more secure future for the Middle East. Ó 2001 Elsevier
Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
In the academic study of world politics, thinking about the future has almost
always been a source of contention. Contending visions of the pessimists (realists
who think that the future will be no better—if not worse—than the past) and the
optimists (idealists who think that a brighter future could be invented through the
strengthening of international institutions) have dominated the debates about the
future of world politics for most of the twentieth century. In recent years, especially
since the end of the Cold War, the pacifying effects of the process of globalisation
and the declining use and usefulness of the military instrument in managing inter-
state relations have been pointed to by some to stress the need for moving beyond
such pessimistic approaches to the future of world politics [1]. The realist response
to such arguments has been to point to parts of the world other than Western Eur-
ope—such as the Middle East—and maintain that the declining usefulness of the
military instrument in some places does not mean that this would be repeated every-
where.
However, although the Middle East remained chronically insecure for most of the
twentieth century, the question that should be asked is whether recent history justifies
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one author’s observation that the Middle East is a region that ‘best fits the realist
view of international politics’ [2] and is therefore destined to relive the past. This
is a question that should be asked because when such stereotypical representations
of the Middle East are coupled with a cyclical view of history that is part and parcel
of the realist approach, the future of the region looks bleak. The significance of such
pessimistic presentations of the future of the Middle East is that they are used to
justify heavily militarised security policies that do not enable this vicious circle to
be broken. Furthermore, such pessimistic conjectures and prognoses have the poten-
tial to become self-fulfilling, thereby making it difficult if not impossible to invent
a new tomorrow for the Middle East.
Critical approaches to international relations seek to bypass these unhelpful dichot-
omies of pessimism/optimism and realism/idealism by pointing to the constitutive
role theories play. From a critical perspective, ‘theories do not simply explain or
predict’, as Steve Smith has maintained. ‘They tell us what possibilities exist for
human action and intervention; they define not merely our explanatory possibilities
but also our ethical and political horizons’ [3]. This is not to say that theories ‘create’
the world in a philosophical sense of the term, but that theories help to organise
knowledge, which, in turn, informs, enables, privileges and legitimises certain prac-
tices whilst inhibiting or marginalising others. In other words, critical approaches to
international relations view the future of world politics as open, for they believe, in
Ken Booth’s words, that “social inventions like international relations cannot be
uninvented overnight, but they can be reinvented, over time” [4].
The proponents of critical approaches have so far adopted a twofold strategy to
put their ideas into practice. One part of their strategy has been that of disturbing
and problematising prevailing discourses, presenting alternative readings, revealing
the choices that were made and the alternatives that were obscured. The second part
of their strategy has been that of trying to put the constitutive potential of theories
into ‘good use’ by presenting pictures of ‘desired futures’ and opening up space for
political action to take place. This is because, in order to be able to make a meaning-
ful change, one has to have some idea as to not only what s/he wants to avoid, but
also what s/he wants to achieve in the future. In other words, from a critical perspec-
tive, if the aim is to help to invent a more secure future for the Middle East—a
region that remained chronically insecure for most of the twentieth century—the task
at hand is both to produce new ideas about alternative futures and to present critiques
of existing scenarios. Towards this end, this essay will discuss five future scenarios
chosen on the basis of their centrality to post-Cold War debates on the futures of
world politics and will investigate their potential practical implications within the
Middle Eastern context.
1. The Middle East in a globalising world
In the 1990s, it has become commonplace to present the future of world politics
as one of increasing globalisation, with the term itself becoming a ‘buzzword’—
often invoked but rarely defined [5]. In brief, globalisation is a process of increase
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in the extensity and intensity of relations between peoples, social groups, organis-
ations and institutions that has been leading towards a global interpenetration of
economic as well as political and military sectors. Although it is often economic
factors, in particular the global integration of production and finance, that are viewed
as the driving forces behind globalisation, the impact of the revolution in communi-
cations and information technologies (particularly the expansion of the World Wide
Web) in increasing peoples’ awareness of each other whilst diminishing the signifi-
cance of the physical distance separating them (‘time–space compression’) is also
recognised as a crucial factor in accelerating this process [6].
As opposed to those who remain sceptical regarding the impact made by the global
integration of production and finance in the peripheries of the world [7], those who
firmly believe in its virtues maintain that increasing globalisation fosters economic
efficiency and helps to provide a remedy to the very problems it perpetuates. In this
new world united in its search for new markets and higher profits, the argument
goes, markets would demand and help to produce common ways of thinking or
even a new global culture, and peoples’ identities as producers and consumers will
overshadow most, if not all, other interests and identities. In such a world, myriad
actors are expected to solve their conflicts by non-military means, not only because
they would achieve common ways of thinking but also because a breakdown in
business relations would simply be regarded as too costly. Hence the expectation of
global security as a result of further globalisation (see, for example, [8]).
The Middle East has so far had an uneven balance sheet in keeping up with an
increasingly globalising world. On the one hand, it is closely linked to world markets
via oil sales, financial flows and arms purchases. The Gulf being the hub of world
oil production means it is fully integrated into the world economy. On the other hand,
the level of integration of the Middle East in general is still below the expectations of
the proponents of increasing globalisation. This being the case, despite the increase
in the density of financial and trade connections between the Middle East and world
markets, especially since the 1970s boom in oil prices, suggests that the region has
had very little to offer with the exception of oil. In a globalised future where oil
may not be as significant a commodity as it currently is, the future of the Middle
East in general and the Gulf in particular may be rather bleak. Alternatively, in a
future where the significance of oil as a commodity does not decrease, the Middle
East may lose its attraction as a source of oil and natural gas since regional reserves
are likely to diminish in about 45 to 70 years time [9].
The relatively low level of integration between world markets and Middle Eastern
economies has partly been due to the fact that the latter were geared towards import-
substitution in the post-colonial era. Although some (such as Tunisia and Turkey)
have switched to export-promotion in the last two decades, many others have either
hesitated or failed to make this shift.1 Syrian and Saudi policy makers, for instance,
have chosen to seek self-sufficiency in basic foodstuffs production for reasons of
economic security—that is, fear of having to rely on external supplies at times of
1 The Lebanon in the 1950s and 1960s was an exception to this statement.
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crises. For others, such as Egypt, the transition from import-substitution to export-
promotion has been hampered by the lack of infrastructure and financial resources.
Furthermore, some regional actors’ negative disposition towards the globalising
forces has also played a role in delaying this shift. Indeed, many regional people,
with the memories of colonialism still fresh in their minds, feel threatened by the
very enmeshing and interpenetration that is involved in the process of globalisation.
The growth of ‘Islamic banking’ is exemplary of some regional actors’ misgivings
regarding the process of globalisation which some view as a ‘colonisation of the
future’—to borrow Ziauddin Sardar’s phrase [10].
Although the proponents of increasing globalisation are not wholly unaware of
regional actors’ misgivings, their response would be to say that Middle Eastern
regimes would sooner or later have to give in. This is necessarily because, they
would argue, ‘the only thing worse than being a part of the evolving economic
hierarchy is being excluded from it’ [11]. If this statement is taken to its logical
conclusion, it could be argued that if Middle Eastern actors were to go against the
wishes and expectations of the forces of globalisation, they would find themselves
marginalised in an increasingly globalising world. Accordingly, in a hypothetical
future where oil prices fall drastically or oil loses its contemporary significance as
a commodity, the Middle East (with the possible exception of Israel, Tunisia, and
Turkey) would find itself on the margins of the world economy with the marginalis-
ation of Gulf economies resulting in a loss of crucial financial support for the rest
of the Arab states.
If oil prices were to remain stable, the Gulf would be likely to remain a part of the
globalised world economy. Southern Mediterranean states should also be expected to
integrate with the global markets largely due to the European Union’s interest in
and continued resource input into their economies.2 In this hypothetical future world,
only Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Iran should be expected to become marginalised—
unless, that is, they agree to adopt the recommended stabilisation and structural
adjustment packages and open up their markets. In such a future world, one should
not expect much improvement in regional security. For, given the intimate links
between Arab societies, it would be very difficult to conceive of security being estab-
lished in some Arab states whilst the rest is still on the margins.
In the 1990s, it was this threat of marginalisation in an increasingly globalising
world that helped to persuade regional governments such as Egypt, Jordan and Mor-
occo to remove the obstacles to free trade. So far this has involved the implemen-
tation of stabilisation and structural adjustment programs by regional governments
in line with the ‘Washington consensus’ [12:18]. Some Gulf economies have also
taken steps towards privatisation and reducing governmental subsidies. Still, the fact
that many Middle Eastern actors seem to have given in to the forces of globalisation
should not be taken to suggest that the outcome is likely to lead to regional security
as the proponents of increasing globalisation hope. On the contrary, the recent trend
towards economic liberalisation in the Middle East could also be viewed as a sign
2 Libya and Algeria are also oil and natural gas producers.
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of helplessness and fear of being marginalised, and not necessarily commitment to
achieving security by way of doing business. The problem with presenting increased
globalisation as the only option is that it constitutes a ‘primary form of alienation’
[13] and could lead to further fragmentation and instability—the very developments
the proponents of increasing globalisation would want to avoid. In other words, the
excesses caused by the uncontrolled character of globalisation not only constitute a
major obstacle on the road to further integration but also feed into the tendency
towards fragmentation.
2. The Middle East as a breeding ground for fragmentation
Notwithstanding one author’s claim that ‘the wretched of the earth want to go to
Disneyworld, not to the barricades’ [14], Robert D. Kaplan maintains that the very
uniformity that is imposed by the global communication and information networks
and the entertainment industry has, at the same time, given rise to a proliferation of
particularisms that manifest themselves as cultural and racial clashes, increasing ero-
sion of states and state-borders, and refugee flows. Although Kaplan is not alone in
his conception of globalisation and fragmentation as two mutually reinforcing pro-
cesses, his approach is singular in its celebration of globalisation in the developed
world and warning about the ‘coming anarchy’ in the developing world [15].
Kaplan’s scenario is based on the assumption that environmental dynamics would,
in the future, further reinforce the process of fragmentation. As a result, the lines
dividing the realm of globalisation (represented by the travellers of his metaphorical
stretch limo) and the realm of fragmentation (made up of the majority of the world’s
peoples who travel on foot and are therefore more amenable to the effects of environ-
mental degradation) would further deepen, leading towards a future world character-
ised by spreading diseases, population upsurges, unprovoked crime, scarcity of
resources, increasing erosion of states and inter-state borders, and the augmentation
of private armies, security firms and transnational criminal organisations (such as
drug cartels) [15:46].
At the first glance, the Middle East does not seem to be a likely candidate for
fragmentation in the way depicted in Kaplan’s scenario. After all, many Middle
Eastern countries have rich oil and natural gas resources, are better off economically
than some relatively deprived parts of the world and could therefore be expected to
remain largely immune to the effects of such fragmentary forces. On the other hand,
it could be argued that environmental factors could push the Middle East into the
realm of fragmentation with, for example, the scarcity of water in quantitative terms
coupled with a deterioration in its quality (due to excessive use) fuelling already
existing divisions between parties that share the same river basins.3 Although the
impact that changes in the global climate would make cannot be predicted, it is
3 Iraq, Syria and Turkey share the Tigris–Euphrates basin, Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority
share the Jordan basin, and Egypt and Sudan share the Nile basin.
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estimated that the Middle East would emerge as one of the problem areas in the
not-so-distant future.
Furthermore, fragmentation could also be caused by a crisis in the economies of
the oil-rich countries of the region that currently desalinate and/or import water at
very high costs. A fall in the oil prices could push Saudi Arabia, for instance, further
into the club of water-scarce countries. In other words, not even the resource-rich
countries of the Middle East would remain immune to the kinds of dynamics empha-
sised in Kaplan’s scenario if the existing scarcity were to be compounded by environ-
mental factors (such as the ‘greenhouse effect’) and demographic trends (unchecked
population growth coupled with rapid urbanisation). The future may indeed bring
‘water wars’ if no preventive action were to be taken [16]. Or, alternatively, the
world may witness a Middle East where some are living in cities and suburbs leading
comfortable lives, whereas the shanty-town dwellers or rural populations that sustain
themselves by agriculture are ‘doomed by a lack of water to drink, soil to till, and
space to survive in’—a future more in line with Kaplan’s stretch limo analogy
[15:59]. And, as Kaplan reminds us, such environments would be likely to become
a breeding ground for particularisms and fragmentation.
However, although the emerging particularisms and the challenge they pose to the
state system may seem like the ‘coming anarchy’ to some, the same processes could
be viewed as novel forms of resistance that could constitute a solution to the very
problems perpetuated by the economic straitjacket forced onto regional economies
in line with the ‘Washington consensus’. Robert Cox is one who thinks that globalis-
ation’s perpetuation of inequalities worldwide could set social forces (such as social
coalitions, labour movements, democratisation struggles) that might in the future lay
down the groundwork for an alternative (‘postglobalisation’) world order. Although
Cox is not unaware of the potential for fragmentation and violent conflict dormant
in the struggles led by the social forces, he maintains that the disintegration of some
units could result in the formation of new alliances thereby bringing about a new
order [17].
Part of the problem with relying on the agency of social forces within the Middle
Eastern context is that when faced with economic hardship, they may show little
resistance against the globalising forces’ efforts to buy them off in an attempt to
strengthen their grip over the populace (as was the case with the EU plan to channel
resources into Southern Mediterranean NGOs to harvest support for increasing
regionalism among Mediterranean-rim countries of the Middle East and the EU). In
sum, given the fact that they have to operate under the double burden of restraint
exercised by both their own governments as well as the pull and push of external
actors (such as the United States or the EU), social forces in the Middle East face
a difficult task if they were to fulfil Cox’s expectations from them.
Although it is always possible to be sceptical about the relevance of Cox’s scenario
within the Middle Eastern context given the restraints imposed upon the activities
of non-state actors by regional governments, there are also instances of non-state
actors undertaking crucial roles in working towards alternative futures. In the case
of the Israel–Palestine issue, for instance, women’s movements helped to make the
Intifada on the part of some Palestinian women, while some of their Israeli counter-
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parts helped to enhance its impact by way of questioning the moral boundaries of
the Israeli state [18]. This is not to suggest that all social forces would be fit to be
considered as agents for change. Nor is it to suggest that an uncritical adoption of
their agendas would not be problematic. Rather the argument is that Cox’s scenario
introduces an element of human agency to reverse the trends set by the forces of
globalisation—a factor that is missing from Kaplan’s scenario of a ‘coming anarchy’.
3. Clash of civilisations
As the universalism of the West fostered by the globalising forces brings it into
conflict with non-Western states, argues Samuel Huntington, the latter would increas-
ingly choose to form coalitions to stand against the West thereby challenging the
Western civilisation. Hence Huntington’s scenario of the future of world politics as
a ‘clash of civilisations’. Huntington maintains that this clash would not remain at
the macro (inter-state) level only; at the micro-level groups belonging to different
civilisations vying for power would also clash with each other. Accordingly, submits
Huntington, the future of world politics would be characterised by cooperation within
and conflict between civilisations [19]. Needless to say, Huntington’s ‘clash of civi-
lisations’ scenario denies the very possibility of the formation of an alliance among
social forces as anticipated by Cox, unless, that is, it is formed by actors that all
belong to the same civilisation.
Notwithstanding the criticisms, the significance of Huntington’s scenario for the
Middle Eastern context stems not necessarily from its consistency (or lack of it) but
from the fact that it is by building upon the declarations of Islamist actors, examples
of terrorism and inter-denominational conflicts from within the Middle East that
Huntington substantiates his argument on the need for a new world order based on
civilisations. It is also worth noting that Huntington borrowed the phrase ‘clash of
civilisations’ from Bernard Lewis, a noted student of the Middle East [20]. One
potential implication of Huntington’s scenario is that it could ‘unwittingly play into
the hands of the fundamentalists’ [21]. The propagation of Huntington-type argu-
ments have so far opened up political space for some Islamist actors who have been
trying to convince their supporters that they should seek to strengthen their own side
and prepare for the coming clash by rallying around their own civilisation [22]—a
call Huntington would recognise as one of his own. The failure of the mass media
in the West in general and in the United States in particular to distinguish between
Islam as a religion and Islamism as an ideology and political movement only adds
to the sense of siege prevalent among some Muslims, and substantiates the claims
of some Islamist actors that Muslims have been chosen as the enemy to replace the
communist threat and that they will be victimised no matter what they do.
Furthermore, Huntington’s scenario could not only play into the hands of Islamist
actors in propagating their own perspective on regional security, but it could also
be utilised to license interventions and militarised security practices by extra-regional
actors from other civilisations whilst marginalising alternative non-militarised prac-
tices designed to create a regional security architecture. If people do indeed ‘rally to
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those with similar ancestry, religion, language, values, and institutions, and distance
themselves from those with different ones’, as Huntington thinks they would
[19:126], then the best that US policy-makers, for instance, could do would be to
seek to maximise friction among the Muslims, on the one hand, and Muslims and
peoples of non-Muslim civilisations, on the other, whilst holding the West together.
Within the Middle Eastern context this may amount to upholding the policy of dual
containment in an effort to prevent the emergence of any regional hegemon, keeping
Muslim/Arab states divided whilst making sure the regional balance of power tilts
towards Israel. Otherwise, a closely coupled community of Muslim/Arab Middle
East, if it were to emerge, could challenge US dominance in the region (this may
or may not constitute a threat to Israel’s security depending on the conceptions and
practices of security adopted by actors on both sides).
Although it may be argued that this has for long been the practice of the United
States and does not necessarily require a license by Huntington, it nevertheless is
true that Huntington’s scenario could be used to explain, for instance, the futility of
the search for a region-wide peace agreement or help to legitimise reliance on the
use of the military instrument in the Middle East (as was the case with the Gulf
War and subsequent bombings of Iraq) whilst other (non-military) practices are
becoming the norm in some other parts of the world.
4. Establishment of democratic peace in the Middle East
The so-called democratic peace theory has been prominent in international
relations since the 1970s [23,24]. After the end of the Cold War it has become more
and more commonplace among US policy makers to refer to the democratic peace
phenomenon—that very few democracies in the last hundred years or so have waged
war on one another—to justify US policy of supporting the spread of democracy.
The implication of the democratic peace scenario within the Middle Eastern con-
text is the basic assertion that in a future Middle East where democracy takes root,
this would have a pacifying effect. One could identify two problems with this conjec-
ture. The first and widely acknowledged problem is that it would be rather difficult
to envision the establishment of democratic peace in the Middle East, because the
region has so far proven to be rather ‘resistant to democratisation’ [25]. However,
it could also be argued that although it is true that the region (with the exception
of Israel and Turkey) has so far remained relatively immune to calls for further
democratisation, to assert that the Middle East could be an exception to the demo-
cratic peace phenomenon is to let one’s thinking be trapped in the present state of
affairs, not realising the potential for change that exists. Indeed, during the 1990s
there has been some movement towards democratisation in the Middle East with
some Arab policy makers moving to respond to their populations’ demands for the
adoption of liberalisation and democratisation measures. In the last decade or so,
multi-party competition for elected legislative assemblies have been either introduced
or expanded in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestine
Authority and Tunisia.
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Although it is possible to argue that a beginning has been made, there are signifi-
cant problems with these developments. For one thing, executive posts in some of
these countries remain uncontested or at times unelected. Moreover, Bahrain, Kuwait,
Oman, and Saudi Arabia still do not have universal suffrage. Libya does have univer-
sal suffrage but elections are never held. In Kuwait suffrage is limited to males aged
21+ who resided in Kuwait before 1921, their sons, and sons of naturalised citizens.
Lastly, the few elections that have been allowed to take place with limited suffrage
are often engineered in line with the wishes of the ruling elite. Indeed, it has been
suggested that elected assemblies are there not to enable genuine political partici-
pation but to enhance domestic and international legitimacy. Still, even engineered
elections are elections and they constitute a deviation from past practices by handing
a certain degree of control to the public over the executive’s actions and lending
them an opportunity to get their voices heard.
The second problem with this scenario is that it is difficult to know whether giving
Arab peoples, for instance, more say in policy making would have led to more or
less clashes with Israel. It could be argued that, if Arab non-state actors had more
say in their countries’ policy making, they could have pushed for more support for
the Palestinian cause, not less. Likewise, they could have demanded and achieved
some degree of integration between Arab countries and/or more uniform responses
to Israel’s actions. In this sense, if the future was to bring increasing political liberal-
isation and democratisation in the Middle East, this could lead to strained relations
with both Israel and the United States, and not necessarily regional peace and secur-
ity. Indeed, it is this very unpredictability of democratic systems that has so far led
the United States to shy away from supporting full democratisation whilst backing
‘friendly tyrants’ [26] and ‘promoting polyarchy’ [27] to help to maintain the status
quo and make the region secure for transition to free-market economies.
5. A Middle Eastern security community
The security community approach developed by Karl Deutsch and his colleagues
during the 1950s is a prime example of attempts within international relations to
bypass the unhelpful dichotomies of idealism/realism or optimism/pessimism and
directly address the problem of regional security. Deutsch and his colleagues were
interested in finding ways of creating an inclusive political community characterised
by the cessation of inter-state violence and the creation of dependable expectations of
peaceful change by way of strengthening relationships among a group of states [28].
The creation of more inclusive political communities has been considered desirable
but not attainable for a long time. As Andrew Linklater has noted, this has had to do
with the perceived need to organise within states for economic and military purposes.
Although the Westphalian state system and its cornerstone, the sovereign state, have
served these purposes for a long time, the reasons for persisting with the system of
sovereign states as an organising principle of world politics have been gradually
eroding [29]. Furthermore, in recent years it has increasingly become evident that
the rising density of economic, social and military relations among myriad actors
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has at the same time increased their vulnerability. This, in turn, led them to seek a
degree of stability by pooling their resources at the regional level. The realisation
of these trends, maintains Linklater, constitutes an immanent potential for the trans-
formation of political community.
Increasing regionalisation of security relations and the creation of a security com-
munity in the Middle East is desirable not only because the twin processes of glo-
balisation and fragmentation have made it more difficult for existing forms of polit-
ical community (that is, states) to fulfil their roles, but also because the creation of
a Middle Eastern security community would help directly address the problem of
regional security. Indeed, one point of strength of the security community approach
stems from the fact that it addresses the problem of regional (in)security directly,
rather than treating it as a side-effect of increasing globalisation or democratisation.
Another point of strength is that the security community approach builds upon Cox’s
understanding of fragmentation. As noted above, central to Cox is the stress he puts
on the agency of social forces in creating a future world where the boundaries of
political community extend beyond that of the sovereign state. Furthermore, the
security community approach provides an explicit account of the potentialities of
human agency; an idea as to what individuals and social groups as well as states
could do if they chose to address their predicament: regional insecurity. Finally, it
provides (however imperfect) the start of a path from an insecure past to a more
secure future [30].
The creation of a security community in the Middle East, therefore, constitutes a
desired future. The question of whether it is possible to envision the creation of a
security community in the Middle East of all places is a difficult one to answer. Given
the aforementioned global changes, the argument for organising security relations at
the regional level is fairly strong. The end of the Cold War and the marginalisation
of many Arab actors, the ‘atomisation’ of the Arab world in the aftermath of the
Gulf War and the accelerated pace of globalisation in other parts of the world suggest
that it may no longer be possible to avoid large-scale change in the Middle East.
However, whether the velocity of these changes would lead to the creation of a
Middle Eastern security community is yet to be seen.
The seeming lack of enthusiasm for the US-backed Middle East Peace Process
and the slow progress of the Euro-Med partnership scheme, especially when viewed
against the backdrop of increasing regionalisation in other parts of the world, could
be viewed as substantiating assertions that the Middle East may be an exception to
trends observed in other parts of the world [31]. However, it could also be argued
that the problem in the Middle East is not necessarily a lack of interest in regionalis-
ation per se, but rather the presence of a multitude of regionalism projects pro-
pounded by different actors (state and non-state) [32]. For instance those who view
themselves as belonging to the ‘Middle East’ work towards increasing cooperation
and collaboration among Arab states, Iran, Israel and Turkey. Those who emphasise
the Arab character of this part of the world aim to increase integration among Arab
actors in an attempt to consolidate regionalisation in the ‘Arab world’. There are
also the proponents of Mediterraneanism that seek to further integrate Mediterranean
littoral economies (which include the EU as well as North African and Eastern Medit-
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erranean countries). Finally, there are the proponents of planting the seeds of an
‘Islamic future’ in the ‘Muslim Middle East’. What is significant about these alterna-
tive regionalism projects is that they are propounded by non-state actors often against
the wishes of their governments.
In sum, the relatively little evidence for regionalisation in the Middle East should
not lead one to turn a blind eye to the efforts of myriad non-state actors that attempt
to put their own regionalism projects into practice. Indeed, as Michael Hudson has
observed, in recent years there emerged ‘a great deal more sociocultural integration
than the naive Arab nationalists of the 1940s and 1950s ever imagined’. In this sense,
the problem in the Middle East is not that there is little or no cooperation, integration
or interdependence but that there exists very little in terms of institutions. As Hudson
reminds us, ‘interdependence does not lead directly to the growth of political com-
munity’ [33].
At present one could observe certain regional trends that could be identified as
factors that could precipitate the creation of a security community in the Middle
East. These factors include the end of the Cold War, which caused a relative decline
in the strategic importance and therefore marginalisation of the region; the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait, the Gulf war and the Madrid Peace Process; changes in the
natural environment, such as global warming, and further depletion of water
resources and technological changes, such as the increase in the ranges of surface-
to-surface missiles that threaten regional stability. Changes in the natural environ-
ment, for instance, could potentially bring regional actors together if they choose to
interpret global warming and the increasing scarcity of water resources as a threat
to their security. After all, these are what Ulrich Beck refers to as ‘threats to the
future’ to cope with which action would need to be taken in the present [34]. Accord-
ingly, there is some potential for cooperation on this issue should regional actors
choose to think more seriously about the long-term future and adopt cooperative
measures that could enhance their gains. However, although a working group
addressing this issue was formed as a part of the multilateral track of the Middle East
Peace Process, there currently is very little evidence of regional actors’ willingness to
adopt cooperative measures to cope with such threats. On the contrary, changes in
the natural environment so far seem to have stiffened some actors’ positions (as is
the case with the conflict surrounding the use of the Tigris–Euphrates river basin
shared by Iraq, Syria and Turkey).
In sum, there clearly is some potential for further regionalisation and the formation
of a security community in the Middle East. However, the same set of factors could
encourage increasing cooperation and collaboration or, alternatively, lead regional
states to resort to militarised practices such as balance of power politics and arms
build-up. Therefore, in order for new interpretations of these factors to emerge in a
way that would propel the regional actors to view each other as potential partners
rather than enemies, there is a need for human agency to intervene and provide them
with alternative readings of their pasts, presents, and especially futures. This is
because the threats of further marginalisation of Arab countries and increasing scarc-
ity of water exist only as ‘threats to the future’. As they exist in the future, the only
way to prevent such threats from becoming ‘reality’ is to take action in the present.
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In the absence of human agents that could provide such alternative readings of the
pasts and presents, and investigate alternative futures, regional actors may remain
oblivious to the drastic changes such as massive population upsurges or the increas-
ing globalisation of world economy, thereby failing to take cooperative measures
that could indeed be to their mutual advantage. This, in turn, requires students of
international relations to think more seriously about the medium- to long-term future.
6. Towards a more secure future?
Thinking about the future of world politics becomes more crucial once we recog-
nise that out ideas about the future—our conjectures and prognoses—have a self-
constitutive potential. What students of realist international relations consider as a
more ‘realistic’ picture of the future becomes ‘real’ through practice, albeit under
circumstances inherited from the past. Thinking about desired futures is significant
for the very same reason; that is, to be able to turn it into a ‘reality’ through adopting
emancipatory practices—for, having a vision of a desired future empowers people
in the present.
Presenting pictures of what desired futures might look like and pointing to the
security community scenario as the start of a path that could take the Middle East
from an insecure past to a more secure future should not be taken to suggest that
this is the most likely outcome. Indeed, an alternative scenario that falls outside the
categories adopted for the purposes of this essay, that of an ‘Islamic future’ for the
Middle East, is considered as a likely outcome by its own proponents; they would
regard it being left out of an analysis such as this one as evidence of the biased
character of the prevailing approaches to security in the Middle East [35].
Although this scenario could potentially constitute another alternative future for
security in the Middle East, the contradictory character of the security discourses
adopted by its proponents has so far caused this potential to remain unfulfilled. Not-
withstanding their globalist discourse, most Islamist non-governmental actors aim to
bring about change at home, even though they may occasionally undertake (violent
as well as non-violent) action abroad to achieve this aim. In other words, the globalist
outlook presented by the Islamist actors becomes locally oriented in practice. Further-
more, although the Islamist discourse perceives threats to security as stemming from
‘un-Islamic’ influences, when it comes to defining what constitutes ‘un-Islamic’ there
is more agreement amongst its proponents as to what they are against rather than
what they are for. Some would consider ‘Western’ influence over and intervention
into the Middle East as ‘un-Islamic’. Some others criticise the existing political estab-
lishments (such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that allowed US troops on the ‘holy
lands’) as well as the forces of Arab nationalism as threats to their security. There
are also those who define ‘structural violence’ as ‘un-Islamic’ and call for its ero-
sion [36].
Interestingly, this last conception of ‘structural violence’ as ‘un-Islamic’ weakens
the case for an ‘Islamic future’ whilst strengthening that for a Middle Eastern security
community. For, when security is conceived as the erosion of ‘un-Islamic’ factors
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understood as ‘structural violence’, it becomes rather problematic to envision a ‘Mus-
lim Middle East’ as a ‘land of peace’ and the rest of the world as the ‘land of war’.
Structural violence does not recognise such conventional boundaries. Furthermore,
this conception of security strengthens the case for a security community by
presenting a conception of security very similar to that adopted by the proponents
of critical approaches thereby showing how it is possible to arrive at similar future
visions although starting from different foundations.
To conclude, the dynamics pointed to when discussing the alternatives indicate
that there exists a potential for descent into chaos if no action is taken to prevent
militarisation and fragmentation of societies and the marginalisation of peoples as
well as economies in an increasingly globalising world. However, these dynamics
exist as ‘threats to the future’ and it is only through thinking (and writing) about
them that one could hope to mobilise prevention action to be taken at present. Viewed
as such, the security community scenario provides not an ‘idealistic’ or ‘optimistic’
but a more ‘realistic’ picture of the future.
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